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Abstract. Modern societies face the challenge that the time scale of opinion formation is continuously
accelerating in contrast to the time scale of political decision making. With the latter remaining of the
order of the election cycle we examine here the case that the political state of a society is determined by the
continuously evolving values of the electorate. Given this assumption we show that the time lags inherent in
the election cycle will inevitable lead to political instabilities for advanced democracies characterized both
by an accelerating pace of opinion dynamics and by high sensibilities (political correctness) to deviations
from mainstream values. Our result is based on the observation that dynamical systems become generically
unstable whenever time delays become comparable to the time it takes to adapt to the steady state. The
time needed to recover from external shocks grows in addition dramatically close to the transition. Our
estimates for the order of magnitude of the involved time scales indicate that socio-political instabilities
may develop once the aggregate time scale for the evolution of the political values of the electorate falls
below 7-15 months.
PACS. 9.75.-k complex systems – 05.45.-a nonlinear dynamical systems
1 Introduction
A dynamical system with time delays reacts not only to
its current state, but also to what occurred in the past. It
is well known in this context that time-delayed dynami-
cal systems are prone to instabilities whenever the delay
times become comparable to the time scales needed to re-
act to current events and perturbations [1,2]. To give an
example from economy, consider just-in-time (JIT) manu-
facturing, for which the time scales regulating the delivery
process are typically of the order of hours [3]. Even small
perturbations in the supply chain would lead to an imme-
diate break down of JIT manufacturing, as a whole, if the
management of the involved companies would need days
or weeks to react to an outage.
The dynamics of democratic political systems shares
certain basic similarities to manufacturing processes like
just-in-time manufacturing, with the political institutions
(parliament, government) reacting to shifts in the demands
of the electorate [4]. It has been noticed in particular that
the temporalities of economy and culture are driven by
every faster cycles of innovation, change and replacement
[5], with political time remaining on the other side high [6].
There is hence an evolving mismatch of the speed of for-
mal democracy [7] with regard to the accelerating speed of
capital [8], of economic decision making, opinion dynamics
[9] and of modern life in general [10].
The ongoing differentiation of societal time scales, with
opinion dynamics accelerating in contrast to institutional
decision making, did manifest itself in several political de-
velopments occurring in 2016/2017. In French politics, to
give an example, electorate values changed so fast that
the ‘En Marche’ movement could raise in essentially a sin-
gle year from nowhere to a center role in French politics
[11]. The extended time scale of three or more years, as
presently envisioned, to carry out the 2016 popular vote
in favor of a Brexit [12], is on the other side exemplary for
the prolonged time political institutions need to react to
demands of the electorate. Our aim is here to develop a
framework describing conflicts of temporalities on a basis
that abstracts from specific circumstances. Our approach
is particularly well suited for advanced democracies, i.e.
for societies in an advanced state of acceleration.
Modern democracies are characterized additionally both
by an increasing level of skepticism towards political insti-
tutions [13] and by the ongoing refinement of political cor-
rectness norms [14,15]. This continuously increasing sen-
sitivity to deviations from the mainstream normative or-
der has its equivalent in economics, where companies not
adhering to normative standards of reliability will if find
difficult, in a world dominated by JIT manufacturing, to
build up profitable business relations. Here we show that
fine-tuned political correctness norms are directly related
to the underlying acceleration of societal responses. Fast
opinion dynamics and a high level of political correctness
are in our model both indicative of political systems close
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Fig. 1. The rescaled Fermi function (3) entering the evolution
(2) of the values V of the electorate. The monotonic decline of
σ(D) implies that the desire to further increase the level D of
democratic participation drops with its actual level. The slope
at the inflection point σ(1) = 1 is −β/2, viz proportional to the
sensibility parameter β. The time scale for opinion dynamics is
hence of the order of 2TV /β. Alternatively one may interpret
the slope and hence β as a proxy for the rigor of political
correctness.
to a dynamical instability. Fine-tuning a political system
reduces consequently its robustness against perturbations.
2 Model
We denote with D = D(t) and with V = V (t) aggregate
variables measuring the state of the democracy and of the
values of the electorate, its cultural dimension [16]. The
time t will be measured in years. We remain here on a rela-
tive abstract level, noting however that standard country-
specific indicators [17,18] for both democracy and values
may be taken as proxies for D and V . Alternatively one
may consider the level of economic development, instead
of the cultural dimension, as the basic variable interacting
with the state of the democracy [19].
A political system is democratic, per definition, when-
ever D(t) is reactive to changes in the values V (t) of the
electorate. This relation is captured by
TD
d
dt
D(t) = V (t− T )−D(t) , (1)
where TD denotes the time democratic institutions need
to aligns themselves to the demands expressed by the elec-
torate. There is however an additional time scale involved,
the time lag T . Time lags arise on one side from the cir-
cumstance that the electorate has to wait in a representa-
tive democracy on the average several years before it can
express its value forcefully at election time [6]. Time lags
also occur generically in political decision making. It will
take about three years, if at all, to implement popular will
in the case of the Brexit [20].
The overall process modeled by (1) describes a highly
idealized democracy. We note, however, that the intrica-
cies of real-life political decision making will enhance the
effect here studied.
For the time evolution of the value V we propose
TV
d
dt
V (t) = σ(D(t))− V (t), (2)
which describes a competition between a trend towards
democracy ∼ σ(D(t)) and an intrinsic decay term of the
democratic values ∼ (−V (t)). It has been observed in this
regard that support for democratic values declines steadily
in western societies [21]. If asked, to give an example,
whether it is essential to live in a country that is governed
democratically, over 70% of US-citizens born around 1930
would respond yes, but only about 30% of those born 1980
or later [21]. This downward trend translates in (2) to a
decay time TV ≈ 15− 20 years.
The actual shape of the function σ(D) entering (2)
is not relevant for the following arguments, as long as it
is monotonically declining and hence reflecting that the
desire to further increases the current amount D(t) of
democratic participation declines with its actual level. A
monotonically declining σ(D) incorporates therefore the
notion of diminishing returns, which can be traced back
in turn to the logarithmic discounting performed by the
neural circuitry of the brain [22,23]. We have chosen here
for simplicity a rescaled Fermi function,
σ(D) =
2
1 + exp(β(D − 1)) , (3)
in physics jargon, for σ(D), as illustrated in Fig. 1. At
the inflection point D = 1 we have σ(D = 1) = 1. The
parameter β, which would correspond to the inverse tem-
perature in physics, is a sensibility parameter, setting the
slope dσ/dD = −β/2 at the inflection point D = 1.
The evolution equations for D(t) and V (t), Eqs. (1)
and (2), have been defined such that the common fixed
point (D,V ) = (1, 1) remains unchanged for all param-
eter settings. This implies, that (1) and (2) describe the
time evolution of quantities which are relative and not
bare measures. The steady-state fixed point would evolve
on the other side if D and V had been measured in ab-
solute terms [17] and not, as done here, relatively. The
renormalization of the steady state to (1, 1) does hence
encompass the secular backdrop of declining democratic
values [21].
3 Simulations results
For the parameters entering the evolution equations for
the state of the democracy and for the values of the elec-
torate, (1) and (2) respectively, we take TD = 4 years for
the typical adaption time of political actors and TV = 15
years for the decay time of political values [21]. We start
with an overview of the properties of our model, (1) to-
gether with (2), for which we set the time delay to T = 4
years. Alternative values for T will be considered subse-
quently together with distinct ways to incorporate mul-
tiple time delays. For the numerical simulations we dis-
cretized the evolution equations (1) and (2), taking one
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Fig. 2. The result of numerically simulating (1) and (2) for T = 4, TD = 4 and TV = 15 (years). The system starts (as denoted
by the label ‘starting’) right after the initial function, defined for t ∈ [−T, 0], ends, with every filled point denoting one year
(decades are red). Note, that trajectories may intersects themselves for dynamical systems with time delays, as it happens for
β = 20. The fixed point (D,V ) = (1, 1) is stable for β < βc ≈ 11.36.
month (∆t = 1/12 years) as a basic time step. The such
obtained results do not depend qualitatively on the exact
value of ∆t.
The solution of a time-delayed systems is generically
contingent on the choice of the initial function (D(t), V (t)),
where t ∈ [−T, 0] [2,24]. We find, however, that the sys-
tem (1) and (2) is robust in the sense that the long-time
state convergences in all cases to the identical attracting
set, which may be either a fixed point or a limit cycle,
even when fully random initial functions are selected.
In Fig. 2 we present typical trajectories for β = 5, 10, 20,
where the starting function was (D(t), V (t)) = (0.8, 0.9),
with t ∈ [−T : 0], together with a random jitter ∆D =
∆V = 0.02. The system is stable, as expected, for small
values of β, with the state (D(t), V (t)) of the system spi-
raling toward the fixed point (1, 1). The overall time-scale
for the evolution is about two decades, as consequence of
TV = 15 year.
For an advanced democracy, characterized by a high
sensibility β = 20 to deviations from the political stan-
dard, the overall attracting set is a limit cycle with a pe-
riod of about 24.5 years and an average deviation
DF =
〈√(
D(t)− 1)2 + (V (t)− 1)2〉 ≈ 0.24 (4)
from the fixed point (1, 1), with the brackets 〈. . .〉 denoting
the time average. In order to decide whether the limit
cycle is far away from the original fixed point, or close,
we may compare above value for DF with the functional
dependency of the response function σ(D) entering (2), as
illustrated in Fig. 1. We observe, that D = 0.8 or D = 1.2
leads to responses σ(D) which are exponentially close to
1 and 0 respectively. This implies, that the limit cycle
observed for β = 20 in Fig. 2 is close to the maximal
possible periodic solution supported by (1) and (2). Even
for a very large β = 80, to give an example, we find only
a slightly increased DF = 0.27.
Also shown in Fig. 2 is a trajectory for β = 10, which
spirals in the end into the fixed point (D,V ) = (1, 1). The
extraordinary long time scale needed to reach the equi-
librium state, for β = 10, is a consequence of the criti-
cal slowing down close to a phase transition, which occurs
here at βc ≈ 11.36 (see discussion below). It may hence be
difficult to distinguish real-world political systems which
are subcritical, but close to an instability, from systems
which are already unstable.
Our basic presumption is here, that advances in com-
munication and organizational structures lead to a pro-
gressing optimization of our societies which is inevitably
accompanied with a decreasing tolerance of non-standard
behaviors and hence with an increasing β, as entering (2).
In Fig. 3 we present a scenario simulation for a time-
varying β, which is held constant at β = 5 for the first
ten years, at β = 10 for the subsequent twenty years and
at β = 20 thereafter. The system tries initially to reach
the equilibrium state (D,V ) = (1, 1), being subcritical for
the first thirty years, with the relaxation towards the fixed
point slowing down dramatically when β → 10 (compare
Fig. 2). Twenty years at β = 10 are not enough to equi-
librate and the final increase to β = 20 leads therefore
straightaway to limit-cycle oscillations.
3.1 Diverging recovery times close to the Hopf
bifurcation
Normal forms allow to classify the type of bifurcations
occurring in normal dynamical systems, viz in dynamical
systems without time delays [2]. The transition observed
here at βc ≈ 11.36 is in this context akin to a classical su-
percritical Hopf bifurcation, involving a bifurcation from
a stable node (fixed point) to a continuously expanding
periodic orbit (stable limit cycle) [25].
In order to corroborate this statement we have evalu-
ated the time dependent distance DF (t) of the trajectory
from the fixed point, as well as its long time average (4). It
is evident from Fig. 4, that the size of the final limit cycle
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Fig. 3. The result of a numerical experiment, for T = 4, TD = 4 and TV = 15 (years), where β = 5 for the first 10 years,
β = 10 for t ∈ [10, 30] and β = 20 thereafter. The evolution is shown for D(t) as a function of time (left) and for (D,V ) in
state space (right). While still subcritical for β = 10, the relaxation process slows down dramatically due to the closeness to the
phase transition occurring at βc ≈ 11.36, compare Fig. 2.
shrinks continuously when β approaches βc from above,
as expected for a second-order transition.
It is of interest to examine, for subcritical β < βc, the
time scale Tλ needed to close in to the equilibrium state
(D,V ) = (1, 1), which is given by the inverse of the largest
Lyapunov exponent of the fixed point [26]. In Fig. 4 we
present alternatively the results of a numerical experiment
simulating the recovery from an external shock. For a sin-
gle trajectory, with starting conditions as for Fig. 2, the
displacement DF (t) from the steady state has been eval-
uated and fitted by exp(−t/Tλ). We notice that the time
needed to recover from the initial displacement becomes
of the order of three decades already for β ≈ 7.5, which
is still substantially below the critical βc ≈ 11.36. The
system is hence very slow to recover from external events
pushing it away from the fixed point.
3.2 Mixture of time delays
With (1) we assumed that the state D(t) tries to align
itself to values the electorate expressed exactly T years
before. A mixture of time delays may contribute in reality.
We consider with
TD
d
dt
D(t) = V α(t)−D(t) (5)
the coupling of D(t) to two specific distributions α = 1, 2
of lag times,
V 1(t) =
1
2T
∫ 2T
0
V (t− τ)dτ (6)
V 2(t) =
1
T
∫ ∞
0
e−τ/TV (t− τ)dτ (7)
where V1(t) and V2(t) correspond respectively to a flat
distribution, with T ∈ [0, 2T ], and to exponentially dis-
counted delay times. The average time delay stays at T in
both cases. We find, as shown in Fig. 4, that a flat distribu-
tion, viz V 1 in Eq. (5), induces only relative minor quanti-
tative changes, with all qualitative features of the original
model (1) remaining untouched. There is a slight upward
renormalization, when using V 1, of the critical sensitivity
from βc ≈ 11.36, as obtained for (1), to βc ≈ 13.5.
For exponentially discounted lag times, describing the
common but not exclusive case that past messages are
progressively discounted in the context of political com-
munication [27], we find numerically that βc ≈ 23.7, which
is now substantially increased, but otherwise no overall
qualitative changes.
4 Stability analysis
The stability of the fixed point (D,V ) = (1, 1) can be
examined [28] by linearizing the evolution equations (1)
and (2)
TD
d
dt
δD(t) = δV (t− T )− δD(t), (8)
TV
d
dt
δV (t) = −β
2
δD(t)− δV (t) , (9)
where δD = D − 1 and δV = V − 1. The Ansatz δD(t) =
D0 exp(λt) and δV (t) = V0 exp(λt) leads to
V0e
−λT = D0(1 + TDλ), D0 = −2V0
β
(1 + TV λ) ,
and hence to
e−λT = − 2
β
(1 + TV λ)(1 + TDλ) . (10)
The Lyapunov exponent λ = λ′ + iλ′′ is generically com-
plex, becoming purely imaginary, with λ′ = 0, at the bi-
furcation β → βc. The real and imaginary components of
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Fig. 4. The results of evaluating the Euclidean distance DF from the fixed point (D,V ) = (1, 1). For β > βc (dashed vertical
line) the time-average DF , Eq. (4), of the limit cycle is shown (multiplied by 100). For β < βc the relaxation time Tλ is shown
(in years). Tλ, which is also the time needed to recover from external shocks, has been obtained by fitting the time-dependent
Euclidean distance DF = DF (t) by exp(−t/Tλ). The data is for the model with a single time delay T = 4 (Eq. (1), left panel) and
for the model with a uniform mixture of time delays (Eq. (5), right panel) and otherwise identical parameters. The respective
critical sensitivities are βc ≈ 11.36 (left) and βc ≈ 13.5 (right).
(10) then are:
cos(λ′′T ) = − 2
βc
(
1− TV TD(λ′′)2
)
, (11)
sin(λ′′T ) =
2
βc
(TV + TD)λ
′′ , (12)
or
tan(Tλ′′) =
(TD + TV )λ
′′
TDTV (λ′′)2 − 1 , (13)
and
β2c
4
=
(
1 + (TDλ
′′)2
) (
1 + (TV λ
′′)2
)
, (14)
where we have used that
(TDTV (λ
′′)2 − 1)2 + (TD + TV )2(λ′′)2
= (1 + (TDλ
′′)2)(1 + (TV λ′′)2) .
One solves first (13) for λ′′ and then (14) for βc. The cor-
responding phase diagram is presented in Fig. 5 for fixed
TD = 4 and TV = 15. The locus of the phase transition
at T = 4 is βc = 11.4, which differs only marginally from
the one found in the numerical simulation, βc = 11.36, for
which time had been discretized (using ∆t = 1/12).
4.1 Uniform mixture of time delays
For the case (5) of an uniform mixture of time delays one
replaces exp(−λT ) in (10) by ∫ exp(−λτ)dτ/(2T ), obtain-
ing
1
2T
∫ 2T
0
cos(λ′′τ)dτ =
2
βc
[
TV TD(λ
′′)2 − 1],
1
2T
∫ 2T
0
sin(λ′′τ)dτ =
2
βc
(TV + TD)λ
′′ ,
which results in turn, after carrying out the respective
integrals, in
sin(2Tλ′′) =
4Tλ′′
βc
[
TV TD(λ
′′)2 − 1],
1− cos(2Tλ′′) = 4Tλ
′′
βc
(TV + TD)λ
′′ .
With sin(2λ′′) = 2 sin(Tλ′′) cos(Tλ′′) and cos(2Tλ′′) =
1− 2 sin2(Tλ′′) we then obtain
tan(Tλ′′) =
(TD + TV )λ
′′
TDTV (λ′′)2 − 1 (15)
and
βc
2
TD + TV
T
=
(
1 + (TDλ
′′)2
) (
1 + (TV λ
′′)2
)
. (16)
Note that the expressions (15) and (13) for the imaginary
component λ′′ of the Lyapunov exponents are identical
and, correspondingly, also the right-hand sides of (16) and
(14). For above transformations we used
[1− cos(2Tλ′′)]/ sin(2Tλ′′) = tan(Tλ′′)
and that
4 sin2(Tλ′′) =
(4Tλ′′)2
β2c
(
1 + (TDλ
′′)2
) (
1 + (TV λ
′′)2
)
=
4 tan2(Tλ′′)
1 + tan2(Tλ′′)
can be simplified when using (15). The bifurcation line
resulting from (16), which has been included in Fig. 5,
runs somewhat parallel to the one obtained via (14) for
the case of a single delay time, closing in for T  TV , when
the actual distribution of lag times becomes unimportant.
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Fig. 5. The Hopf bifurcation line for the case of a single time delay (full red curve), for a uniform distribution of delay times
(dashed cyan curve) and for exponentially distributed time delays (full blue curve). The attracting state is a limit cycle above
the respective lines (viz in the shaded region for the case of a single time delay), and a fixed point otherwise. The dashed
rectangle indicates the case of a single time delay T = 4, and an adaption time scale for V (t) of TV = 15. Left: For TD = 4 and
the original model (1) and (2), respectively (5), for which the bifurcations lines βc are determined by (14), (16) and (19). Right:
For the adiabatic limit (20), obtained when TD → 0. In this limit there is no Hopf bifurcation for exponentially discounted time
delays.
For T = 4 we find that βc increases from βc = 11.4 to
βc = 13.68.
Comparing (13) and (15) one finds, remarkably, that
the imaginary part λ′′ of the Lyapunov exponent is iden-
tical at criticality, albeit at different values of βc. This
implies, that the revolution frequencies of the resulting
limit cycles are identical in the respective limits β → βc
from above.
4.2 Exponentially discounted time delays
For exponentially discounted delay times (5) we need
1
T
∫ 2T
0
e−t/T cos(λ′′τ)dτ =
1
1 + (Tλ′′)2
,
1
T
∫ 2T
0
e−t/T sin(λ′′τ)dτ =
Tλ′′
1 + (Tλ′′)2
,
which results respectively in
1
1 + (Tλ′′)2
=
2
βc
(
TV TD(λ
′′)2 − 1) , (17)
1
1 + (Tλ′′)2
=
2
βc
TV + TD
T
(18)
instead of (11) and (12). We then find
(λ′′)2 =
TD + TV + T
TDTV T
βc = 2
TD + TV
T
[
1 + (Tλ′′)2
]
(19)
for the Hopf bifurcation line. The critical βc has been in-
cluded in Fig. 5. For TD = 4 = T and TV = 15 the result-
ing βc = 24.1 is again marginally larger than the value,
βc ≈ 23.7, obtained from corresponding time discretized
numerical simulation.
4.3 Adiabatic limit
We have shown above that our model is robust against
changes in the distribution of time delays. The nature of
the attracting states are also not sensitively dependent on
the ratio of TD/TV . It is illustrative, in this context, to
examine the adiabatic limit TD  TV of (1) and (2), for
which D(t) follows closely V (t − T ). In this case one can
substitute D(t) by V (t− T ) in (2), obtaining
TV
d
dt
V (t) = σ(V (t− T ))− V (t) . (20)
The locus of the bifurcation is determined by (14) in the
limit TD → 0, or, alternatively, by
tan(xT/TV ) = −x, β
2
c
4
= 1 + x2, x = TV λ
′′ ,
(21)
when using rescaled variables. βc is then dependent only
on the ratio T/TV , as shown in Fig. 5. For the case of a
uniform mixture of time delays (15) and (16) reduce to
tan(xT/TV ) = −x, βc
2
TV
T
= 1 + x2 (22)
in the limit TD → 0. One notices, compare Fig. 5, that
there is a substantial quantitative difference in the adia-
batic limit between having a single and a mixture of time
delays.
Interestingly, there is no phase transition in the adia-
batic limit for the case of exponentially discounted time
delays, with (17) having no solution in the limit TD → 0.
4.4 Properties of the phase diagram
The phase diagrams presented in Fig. 5 have a series of
common features.
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– The Hopf bifurcation line is a monotonically decreasing
function. For small time delays T one needs a higher
sensibility β > βc for the instability to occur, and vice
verse.
– There is no minimal time delay T , viz there is a critical
βc <∞ for any T > 0, with
lim
T/TV→0
βc(T/TV )→∞ . (23)
The fixed point is hence stable for all β when there is
no time delay, T = 0.
– There is a lower βc below which the fixed point is stable
even when T is arbitrary large. In the adiabatic limit
(21) one needs βc > 2.
– The imaginary part λ′′ of the Lyapunov exponent needs
to be non-zero for (13) and (15) to have a non-trivial
solution. λ′′ is hence finite at the transition, the tell-
sign of a Hopf bifurcation [2]. The revolution frequency
of the limit cycle, which is of the order of 1/|λ′′|, is
hence not critical, varying smoothly above the transi-
tion.
In the vicinity of the transition the sensibility β induces a
speed-up of the reactive value dynamics, as evident from
the linearized equations (8) and (9), by a factor β/2, which
may be identified with a corresponding acceleration of
opinion dynamics. The overall time needed to reach the
fixed point nevertheless diverges as 1/λ′ ∼ 1/|β−βc|. This
phenomenon, known as critical slowing down, is observed
generically in dynamical systems close to a tipping point.
It is observed in a wide range of settings, affecting, e.g.,
the resilience of ecosystems [29] as well as the evolution of
the climate prior to a major shift [30]. The increased time
scales needed to react to disturbances close the instability
are also evident in Fig. 4.
5 Discussion
There are two mutually not exclusive routes to describe
the conflict between slow political decision making and ac-
celerating social dynamics [6,8,10]. In the first view poli-
tics continuously adapts, over the course of TD years, to
the current demands of the electorate. Time lags are ab-
sent in this scenario and the system stable for all parame-
ters. Politics then evolves around a stable state, with devi-
ations from the fixed point driven exclusively by external
events.
Here we have examined a second possibility, namely
that a certain fraction of political decision making results
from the response to demands the electorate voiced T
years ago. The time delay T may be either fixed or drawn
from a continuous distribution, as described by Eqs. (1)
and (5) respectively. For both cases we find that the socio-
political system becomes inherently unstable whenever the
electorate responds sensitively to political changes. This
conclusion, which is robust and independent of the details
of the here used model, results from the fact that time
delays will inherently amplify fluctuations once their in-
fluence becomes substantial.
In our model the sensitivity β of the electorate leads
to typical reaction times 2TV /β, as evident form the lin-
earized evolution equation (9), where TV is the time scale
for the long-term evolution of basic political values. In or-
der to obtain estimates for real-world political communi-
cation we considered the case of exponentially discounted
time delays, for which the instability occurs at βc ≈ 24.1
for T = 4 and at βc ≈ 50.7 for T = 1 (compare Fig. 5).
Socio-political instabilities then start to manifest them-
selves for T = 4 when the corresponding times scale 2TV /βc
for the opinion dynamics falls below 30/24.1 years (about
15 months). For a time delay of one year, T = 1, insta-
bilities develop when the opinion dynamics takes place on
time scale below 30/50.7 years (about 7 months).
Our estimates for the tipping point of political opinion
dynamics, 7-15 months when assuming mean time delays
of the order of 1-4 years, are for aggregate processes which
include the effects of fast news propagation as well as the
consequences of slowly but continuously changing preset
political beliefs. It is conceivable within out model that
western democracies have seen the unfolding of a slow but
steady long-term acceleration of opinion dynamics, with
the passing of the threshold of 7-15 months contributing
to the recent emergence of political styles disrupting polit-
ical conventions considered hitherto as fundamental [20].
External effects, such as the 2007-08 financial crisis [31,
32], would induce in this view an additional temporary
but sharp rise in β.
An important aspect regards the time needed to re-
cover from an external disrupting event, such as a global
crisis. Naively one may expect that the accelerating pace
of opinion formation observed in advanced democracies
would reduce typical recovery times. The contrary is how-
ever the case. It is well known, as illustrated in Fig. 4, that
second order instabilities lead to critical slowing down in
their proximity and hence to diverging recovery times. As
a consequence one observes long-lasting oscillations even
below the actual transition, illustrated shown in Fig. 2.
Analogous oscillations matching both the period (about 20
years), and the magnitude (10%-15%), have be observed
since the early 1990th in Australian polls studying aggre-
gate value orientations along the materialism vs. postma-
terialism axis [33]. A substantially larger corpus of data
would however been needed for an eventual validation, or
falsification, of the here presented approach. Note that our
framework describes instabilities arising within represen-
tative democracies and not transitions to non-democratic
regimes.
The scope of the work presented here is to point out
a phenomenon of possible key importance for the under-
standing of the long-term stability of representative democ-
racies. The instabilities we find lead to oscillatory but not
to irregular socio-political states. One possibility to ex-
tend our study would however be to consider time delays
varying periodically with the election cycle. It is to be ex-
pected that such kinds of non-constant time delays would
act as periodic drivings [34], which are in turn known to in-
duce transitions to chaotic states in non-linear dynamical
systems. We note in this context that transitions to po-
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tentially disrupting states with runaway opinion growth
have been observed [35] in agent based simulations ex-
amining the response of an electorate to rising levels of
immigration.
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